Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

State of Utah v. Candelo Perez Lopez : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joan C. Watt; Denise M. Williamson; Attorneys for Appellee.
Karen A. Klucznik; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; B. Fred
Burmester; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Lopez, No. 20030568 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4446

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE Of UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20030568-CA
v.
CANDELO PEREZ LOPEZ,
Defendant/Appellee.

REPL Y BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM ORDER DISMISSING THE CHARGE OF
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, BUT ALLOWING
THE STATE TO PROCEED ON THE SEPARATE CHARGE OF ATTEMPTED
MURDER, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE DENNIS M. FUCHS, PRESIDING

JOAN C. WATT
DEN1SE M. WILLIAMSON
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7911)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
B. FRED BURMESTER
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20030568-CA
v.
CANDELO PEREZ LOPEZ,
Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM ORDER DISMISSING THE CHARGE OF
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, BUT ALLOWING
THE STATE TO PROCEED ON THE SEPARATE CHARGE OF ATTEMPTED
MURDER, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE DENNIS M. FUCHS, PRESIDING

JOAN C. WATT
DENISE M. WILLIAMSON
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
B. FRED BURMESTER
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

INTRODUCTION

1

ARGUMENT

1

A. REPLY TO POINT A. 1 OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: UNDER HA WATMEH, A
TRIAL COURT MAY PROPERLY CONSIDER A FINLAYSONMERGER
CLAIM ONLY AFTER THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF
THE KIDNAPPING CHARGE UPON WHICH SUCH A CLAIM IS BASED
2
1.

2.

Merger claims, unlike multiplicity claims, are not ripe until a defendant has
actually been convicted of the charges that allegedly merge; therefore,
defendant's reliance on multiplicity cases to assert that the trial court
properly considered his Finlayson merger claim before trial is misplaced

3

a. The distinction between multiplicity claims and merger claims

3

b. Crosby and Finlyason confirm that Utah law treats multiplicity and
merger claims differently

8

Under Hawatmeh, a trial court may consider a Finlyason merger claim
only after a defendant has been convicted of the kidnapping upon which
such a claim is based

10

B. REPLY TO POINT A.2 OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: BECAUSE
DEFENDANT'S FINLAYSON MERGER CLAIM WAS PREMATURE, THE
TRIAL COURT COULD PROPERLY CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS ONLY AS A MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER, TO WHICH
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING EVIDENTIARY STANDARD APPLIED

15

C. REPLY TO POINT B.2 OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: EVEN IF THE TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED DEFENDANT'S FINLAYSON MERGER
CLAIM BEFORE TRIAL, THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
DEFENDANT'S AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING CHARGE
18
CONCLUSION

24
i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Gorev. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958)

4

Messer v. Roberts, 1A F.3d 1009 (10th Cir. 1996)

23

Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984)

17

United States v. Allen, 13 F.3d 105 (4th Cir. 1993)

5

United States v. Chilingirian, 280 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2002)

3

United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2002),
cert denied, 537 U.S. 1208 (2003)

3

United States v. Dixon, 273 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2001)

3, 5

United States v. Etsitty, 130 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1997)

7

United States v. Grinkiewicz, 873 F.2d253 (11th Cir. 1989)

3, 5

United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3rd Cir. 1977)

3, 17

United States v. Jabara, 644 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1981)

17

United States v. Sarracino, 131 F.3d943 (10th Cir. 1997)
United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1979)
United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952)

6
17
5

STATE CASES
Bradley v. State, 533 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 2000)

7

Brown v. State, 535 A.2d 485 (Md. 1988)

4, 5, 6

State v. Buggs, 547P.2d720 (Kan. 1976)

21

Burkett v. State, 633 A.2d 902 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993)
ii

6, 7

Kunzlerv. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1993)
People v. Melendez, 533N.Y.S.2d361 (Crim. Ct.N.Y. 1988)

16
7, 14, 16

People v. Morales, 538 N.Y.S.2d 541 (A.D. 1989),
appeal withdrawn, 544 N.E.2d 233 (N.Y. 1989)
Richardson v. State, 2000 WL. 852442 (Alaska App. 2000)

14, 15
7

State v.Allen, 839P.2d291 (Utah 1992)

17

State v. Burden, 69 P.3d 1120 (Kan. 2003)

20

State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991)

17

State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981)

11

State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996)

2, 3, 8, 9

State v. Derango, 613 N.W.2d 833 (Wise. 2000)
State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243
State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d491 (RI2004)

8
8, 9, 11
3

State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51,26 P.3d 223
State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, 20 P.3d 342

2,8, 10, 11, 13
3

State v. McGuire, 686N.E.2d 1112 (Ohio 1997)

14

State v. Mead, 318N.W.2d440 (Iowa 1982)

22

State v. Michielli, 937 P.2d 587 (Wash. 1997)

6,7, 15

State v. Moore, 504 A.2d 804 (N.J. Super. 1985)

7

State v. Morfitt, 956 P.2d 719 (Kan. App. 1998)

8

State v. Morrison, 2001 UT73,31 P.3d547

9

State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987)

9
Hi

State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, 72 P.3d 692,
cert, denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2003)

2, 12,13

State v. Talbot, 972P.2d435 (Utah 1998)

16

State v. Warner, 626 A.2d 205 (R.I. 1993)

15

Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948 (Del. Supr. 1988)

21,22

White v. State, 639 A.2d 194 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994)

6

STATE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301, 76-5-302 (Supp. 2001)

22

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 2001)

20

Utah R. Crim. P. 12

5
OTHER WORKS CITED

Lafave, § 19.3 (2003)

4

42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 160 (2004)

5

iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20030568-CA
v.
CANDELO PEREZ LOPEZ,
Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
The State's Reply Brief of Appellant responds to Points A.l, A.2, and B.2 of
defendant's Brief of Appellee. The State relies on its opening Brief of Appellant to
supplement the arguments it now presents.
ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the trial court acted properly by considering his Finlayson
merger claim in a pre-trial motion. Aplt. Br. at 6-13. He further claims that, because his
motion was heard after he had waived a preliminary hearing, the evidentiary standard
applicable to preliminary hearings did not apply to his motion but, rather, that the State
had to establish separate offenses by a preponderance of the evidence. Aple. Br. at 13-18.
Finally, he claims that the evidence did not do so in this case. Aple. Br. at 18-38. The
State challenges all three of defendant's contentions.

A.

REPLY TO POINT A.l OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: UNDER
HAWATMEH, A TRIAL COURT MAY PROPERLY CONSIDER A
FINLAYSONMERGER CLAIM ONLY AFTER THE DEFENDANT
HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF THE KIDNAPPING CHARGE UPON
WHICH SUCH A CLAIM IS BASED.
Defendant cites State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), and four federal cases

to support his claim that defendant properly filed and the trial court properly considered
his Finlayson merger claim before trial. Aple. Br. at 7-8, 11-12. However, Crosby and
defendant's federal cases address multiplicity claims, not merger claims. Although
related, multiplicity and merger address different issues arising at different stages of a
criminal proceeding. Multiplicity claims arise at the pleading stage; merger claims arise
only after trial once multiple convictions are imminent. Accordingly, rules governing the
former do not govern the latter. For this reason, defendant's cases do not support the trial
court's pre-trial merger ruling here.
Alternatively, defendant asserts that State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, 26 P.3d 223,
and State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, 72 P.3d 692, cert denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah
2003), support the trial court's reaching defendant's merger claim in a pre-trial hearing.
Aple. Br. at 9-10. Hawatmeh clearly does not. Smith, to the extent it conflicts with or
misinterprets Hawatmeh, must be rejected.

2

1.

Merger claims, unlike multiplicity claims, are not ripe until a
defendant has actually been convicted of the charges that
allegedly merge; therefore, defendant's reliance on multiplicity
cases to assert that the trial court properly considered his
Finlayson merger claim before trial is misplaced.

Defendant cites to numerous cases addressing multiplicity claims to support his
claim that the trial court properly considered his merger claim before trial. See Aple. Br.
at 7-8, 11-12 (citing State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), United States v.
Chilingirian, 280 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Dixon, 273 F.3d 636 (5th Cir.
2001); United States v. Grinkiewicz, 873 F.2d 253 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3rd Cir. 1977)). However, although related, merger and the
doctrine of multiplicity are distinct doctrines that address distinct concerns arising at
distinct stages of a criminal proceeding. Therefore, rules governing multiplicity claims
do not apply to merger claims.
a.

The distinction between multiplicity claims and merger
claims.

Both merger and the doctrine of multiplicity arise from the double jeopardy
guarantee that protects a defendant from receiving multiple punishments for a single
crime. See State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 500 (RI 2004) ("Merger is essentially a
double jeopardy argument."); United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 2002),
cert denied, 537 U.S. 1208 (2003) (noting that rule against multiplicity implicates double
jeopardy protections); State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, \ 143, 20 P.3d 342 (noting that one
facet of double jeopardy is "protection against multiple punishments for the same crime").

3

However, they are distinct doctrines that, although tending to coalesce when considered at
the end of a trial, address different issues arising at different stages of a criminal
proceeding:
Multiple punishment challenges generally arise in one of two
broad contexts:
"(a) A statute or a portion thereof proscribes designated
conduct, and the question is whether the defendant's conduct
constitutes more than one violation of this proscription. Thus,
murdering two people simultaneously might well warrant two
punishments but stealing two one-dollar bills might not. (b)
Two statutes or two portions of a single statute proscribe
certain conduct, and the question is whether the defendant can
be punished twice because his conduct violates both
proscriptions. Thus, selling liquor on a Sunday might warrant
two punishments for violating a prohibition law and a blue
law, but feloniously entering a bank and robbing a bank,
though violative of two statutes, might warrant but a single
punishment"
Brown v. State, 535 A.2d 485, 487 (Md. 1988) (quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S.
386, 393-94 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
As the Maryland court explains, the first context involves the doctrine of
multiplicity. "Whether a particular course of conduct constitutes one or more violations of
a single statutory offense affects an accused in three distinct, albeit related, ways:
multiplicity in the indictment or information, multiple convictions for the same offense,
and multiple sentences for the same offense." Id; see also Lafave, § 19.3(c) (2003)
(explaining that multiplicity in charges "is often the product of a prosecutor's mistaken
assumption that a particular statute creates several separate offenses rather than a single
crime that can be accomplished through multiple means" or "when a series of repeated
4

acts are charged as separate crimes but the defendant claims they are part of a continuous
transaction and therefore a single crime"); United States v. Allen, 13 F.3d 105, 107 (4th
Cir. 1993) (holding "the doctrine of'multiplicity' . . . , strickly speaking, refers to the
charging of each act in a series of identical acts as though it were a separate crime"); cf.
42 CJ.S. Indictments and Informations § 160 (2004) (noting federal rule of criminal
procedure addresses multiplicity issue and "is intended to eliminate use of multiple counts
for purpose of alleging commission of an offense by different means or in different
ways").
Multiplicity is a pleading defect that "turn[s] on the unit of prosecution of the
offense and this is ordinarily determined by reference to legislative intent." Brown, 535
A.2d at 488 & n.5. Multiplicity, therefore, is an issue that may be addressed before trial.
See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) ("Any defense, objection or request, including a request for
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination without the
trial of the general issue, may be raised prior to trial by written motion.") (emphasis
added); Dixon, 273 F.3d at 642 (holding that although claim of multiplicity of convictions
must be raised before trial, claim of multiplicity of sentences may be addressed for first
time on appeal); Grinkiewicz, 873 F.2d at 255 (same); but see United States v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 225 (1952) ("Whether an aggregate of acts constitute a
single course of conduct and therefore a single offense, or more than one, may not be
capable of ascertainment merely from the bare allegations of an information and may
have to await the trial on the facts.").
5

In contrast, the second context, in which a court must determine "whether two
different offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes," arises "in the context of
merger of offenses in a single trial and successive trials for the same offense." Brown,
535A.2dat488.
"Merger," unlike multiplicity, is "a device to amalgamate separate and legitimate
convictions so as to avoid multiple punishments." Burkett v. State, 633 A.2d 902, 909-10
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (emphasis added); Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) 1009
(defining "merger" as "[t]he absorption of a lesser included offense into a more serious
offense when a person is charged with both crimes, so that the person is not subject to
double jeopardy"). Thus, in contrast to a multiplicity claim, in which a defendant argues
that multiple acts constitute a single crime under the law, "[i]t is not the case [with
merger] that the defendant is not guilty of the lesser offenses; it is rather the case that he
is guilty of those lesser offenses but simply is not to be twice punished." White v. State,
639 A.2d 194, 199 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
Merger does not identify a pleading defect. Thus, merger "does not prevent the
State from charging a defendant with multiple crimes, even when those crimes may
merge." State v. Michietli, 937 P.2d 587, 592 (Wash. 1997) (en banc).
Rather, a claim of merger "arises only after the State has successfully obtained
guilty verdicts on the charges that allegedly merge—if the jury acquits on one of the
charges, the merger issue never arises." Id at 592; cf. United States v. Sarracino, 131
F.3d 943, 946, 950-51 (10th Cir. 1997) (reaching on appeal defendant's claim that
6

kidnapping conviction merged with murder conviction even though defendant apparently
did not raise issue at trial); United States v. Etsitty, 130 F.3d 420, 426-27 (9th Cir. 1997)
(reaching on appeal defendant's claim that kidnapping conviction merged with assault
convictions even though defendant apparently did not raise issue until after trial).
Thus, unlike with a multiplicity claim, "[t]he court cannot use the merger doctrine
to dismiss a charge prior to trial because the court cannot predict which charges on which
the defendant will be convicted." Michielli, 937 P.2d at 592; see also Richardson v. State,
2000 WL 852442 (Alaska App. 2000) (rejecting claim that "defendant is entitled to
require the trial court to merge charges before trial"); Bradley v. State, 533 S.E.2d 727,
730-31 (Ga. 2000) (holding that, where convictions were overturned on appeal, "it is
premature to reach the issue of whether the two offenses must merge for sentencing");
Burkett v. State, 633 A.2d 902, 909-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (holding that "[m]erger
.. . is a question that does not arise until the time of sentencing"); State v. Moore, 504
A.2d 804, 809 (N.J. Super. 1985) (holding merger motion "is premature when it is
considered at the pretrial stage"); People v. Melendez, 533 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362-63 (Crim.
Ct. N.Y. 1988) (concluding that "a motion to dismiss under the merger doctrine a count of
unlawful imprisonment from an otherwise sufficient complaint is premature when the
fact-finding process has not yet taken place").

7

The Utah Supreme Court recognizes the distinction between multiplicity claims
and merger claims. Thus, the court's merger cases, not its multiplicity cases, govern
defendant's Finlayson merger claim.1
b.

Crosby and Finlayson confirm that Utah law treats
multiplicity and merger claims differently.

Defendant claims that, under State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), "to be
timely a motion for application of the merger doctrine must be made before a case goes to
the jury." Aple. Br. at 7-8 (discussing). However, Crosby is a multiplicity case. As State
v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243, clearly indicates, multiplicity cases do not
govern when merger claims must be raised in order to be timely. More importantly, the
issue in this case is not when a defendant may properly file a Finlayson merger motion,
but, rather, when a trial court may properly consider it. Even Finlayson does not address
that issue. Only State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, 26 P.3d 223, does.
In Crosby, the defendant claimed that his counsel provided ineffective assistance
in failing to challenge his conviction on three counts of theft based on conduct which
clearly under Utah law should have been consolidated into one charge. See Crosby, 927
P.2d at 646. On appeal, the supreme court noted that defense counsel "failed to raise the
issue during trial, instead filing a motion to arrest judgment or, in the alternative, to
consolidate the convictions." Id. at 646. The supreme court then held that, because an
!

The State recognizes that certain jurisdictions appear to use the term multiplicity
to refer to both traditional multiplicity claims and traditional merger claims. See, e.g.,
State v. Morfitt, 956 P.2d 719, 728-29 (Kan. App. 1998); State v. Derango, 613 N.W.2d
833, 841-42 (Wise. 2000). However, as discussed below, Utah is not one of those states.
8

objection to an information "that is not made either before or during trial is deemed
waived/5 counsel's motion was "untimely." Id. (citing State v. Lairby, 669 P.2d 1187,
1192 (Utah 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628,
631 n.8 (Utah 1987)). The court nonetheless held that, "[g]iven the facts of this case and
clear Utah case law on this issue,... the convictions should be consolidated." Id.
Based on the discussion above, Crosby's claim was clearly one of multiplicity, not
merger. See pp. 3-8 supra. Indeed, the words "merge" and "merger" appear nowhere in
the court's discussion. See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 645-46; see also State v. Morrison, 2001
UT 73, f^f 23-26, 31 P.3d 547 (reviewing trial court's pre-trial ruling on defendant's
motion to "consolidate" fifty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor into one count
under rule against multiplicity; the words "merge" and "merger" appear nowhere in the
court's discussion). Thus, Crosby does not mandate when a defendant must present his
merger claim in order for it to be deemed timely.
State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243, confirms this. In Finlayson, the
defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping, rape, and forcible sodomy. 2000 UT
10, \ 1. On appeal, the defendant claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance in failing to move for merger of his aggravated kidnapping conviction with his
other convictions. Id. at \ 9. The supreme court agreed where defense counsel "made no
objection to this charge, and failed to raise this at any time, either during trial, or
following the conviction in a motion to vacate." Id. at ^ 24, 25.

9

Thus, under Finlayson, a defendant may properly move for merger after conviction
"in a motion to vacate." Id. In reaching that conclusion, Finlayson implicitly
distinguishes between merger claims, which do not arise until the last stage of a criminal
proceeding and thus may be raised at that stage, and multiplicity claims, which arise
before trial and thus must be raised at an earlier point in the proceedings.
However, as previously stated, the issue in this case is not when a defendant may
properly raise a Finlayson merger claim. Rather, the issue is when a trial court may
properly rule on that claim. Only State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, 26 P.3d 223, answers
that question.
2.

Under Hawatmeh, a trial court may consider a Finlayson merger
claim only after a defendant has been convicted of the
kidnapping upon which such a claim is based.

Defendant contends that State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, 26 P.3d 223, supports
his claim that the trial court properly considered his pre-trial Finalyson merger motion.
Aple. Br. at 9-10. To the contrary, Hawatmeh clearly establishes that the trial court's
Finlayson ruling was premature and therefore improper.
In Hawatmeh, defendants were charged with aggravated kidnapping and
aggravated assault for conduct that spanned two days. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 5 1 , ^ 1 , 4 12. After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate, relying on the Finlayson merger doctrine,
reduced the aggravated kidnapping charge to simple kidnapping. Id. at ^| 2. In reversing
the magistrate's decision, the supreme court made clear that the Finlayson merger
doctrine does not apply to pre-trial proceedings:
10

The district court made its ruling based on the case of State v.
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243, where we held that the
defendant's detention of his rape victim before and during the sexual
assault did not support a kidnaping conviction because it was
"incidental to the assault," and thus, merged into the underlying
sexual assault. Id. at Tf 23. Finlayson is not applicable to the instant
case, however, because we are not dealing with convictions for
aggravated kidnaping, but merely aggravated kidnaping charges.
Furthermore, although Finlayson may be applicable to the
aggravated assault charge based on events on October 13, defendants
do not dispute that the simple kidnaping charge is a separate
incident, based only upon October 14 events. The State argues that
evidence regarding October 14 events is sufficient to support an
inference of aggravated kidnaping. Therefore, we treat the events of
October 14 as a crime separate from the assault on October 13, and
merger is not at issue.
Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, \ 17 n.3 (emphasis added). The clear import of the emphasized
language is that the proper time for a trial court to consider a Finlayson merger claim is
after a defendant has been convicted of the kidnapping charge on which such a claim
rests. See also Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,ffif19-20. (discussing test under State v. Couch,
635 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1981), "for determining when a defendant's kidnapping conviction
is sustainable in addition to his sexual assault conviction") (emphasis added).
Defendant ignores this Hawatmeh language, however, in favor of admittedly
ambiguous language in the next sentence. According to defendant, the court's statement
that "Finlayson may be applicable to the aggravated assault charge based on events on
October 13," Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, ^ 17 n3, indicates that "the court in Hawatmeh
recognized" that Finlayson may apply "at the preliminary hearing phase" of a trial. Aple.
Br. at 10.
11

Defendant's contention rests on the premise that the supreme court announced a
clear holding in one sentence and then completely contradicted itself in the next.
Defendant's contention must be, and easily can be, rejected.
Given the clarity with which the supreme court held that "Finlayson is not
applicable" to pre-conviction proceedings, there are at least two reasonable interpretations
of the court's next sentence. The first is that, in using the phrase "although Finlayson
may be applicable," the court actually meant, "even if Finlayson were applicable." The
second is that the court was merely commenting that, under a different factual scenario
than the one presented, Finlayson may have become applicable at a later stage of the
proceedings. Cf. State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, \ 11 n.4, 72 P.3d 692 ('"While the
Double Jeopardy Clause may protect a defendant against cumulative punishments for
convictions on the same offense, the Clause does not prohibit the State from prosecuting
[defendants] for such multiple offenses in a single prosecution.'") (quoting Ohio v.
Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984)), cert, denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2003).
Because either of these alternatives provides a reasonable interpretation of the
"may be applicable" language in Hawatmeh while avoiding an interpretation premised on
the supreme court's announcing a holding in one sentence and then immediately
contradicting itself in the next, the only proper interpretation of Hawatmeh's Footnote 3 is
that a Finlayson merger claim is properly considered only after a defendant has been
convicted of both the aggravated kidnapping charge and the alleged host crime.

12

Moreover, contrary to this Court's suggestion in State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179,
% 11 n.4, 72 P.3d 692, see Aple. Br. at 10, such an interpretation of Hawatmeh does not
conflict with Finlayson. In Smith, the State argued that the defendant failed to preserve
his non-Finlayson merger claim because he presented it "prior to Smith's convictions."
Smith, 2003 UT App 179, If 11. This Court noted that the State's argument was based on
the Hawatmeh language and that the State "interprets this language to mean that the issue
of merger cannot be properly considered 'until after a jury has rendered its verdict and
defendant is subject to multiple convictions for the same act." Id. (emphasis in original).
This Court concluded that "a brief review of Finlayson clearly contradicts this
interpretation," where Finlayson "examined the nature of the charges arrayed against the
defendant and determined that 'the facts of this case do not support a conviction for
aggravated kidnaping . . . [y]et defendant's counsel made no objection to this charge, and
failed to raise this at any time, either during trial, or following the conviction on a motion
to vacate.'" Id. (quoting Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 24) (emphasis by this Court).
However, language in Finlayson quoted in Smith did not address when a trial court
may properly consider a Finlayson merger claim, but only when a defendant may properly
present such a claim. Thus, contrary to this Court's suggestion in Smith, Finlayson does
nothing to undermine Hawatmeh's holding that Finlayson does not apply when "we are
not dealing with convictions for aggravated kidnaping, but merely aggravated kidnaping
charges." Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, \ 17 n.3.
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Finally, Hawatmeh's holding is consistent both with the general merger cases cited
above, see pp. 6-7 supra, and with the only cases found by the State specifically
addressing the propriety of reaching Finlayson-type merger motions before trial. See
People v. Morales, 538 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (A.D. 1989) ("Since the [merger] rule's
purpose is to prevent the unfair enhancement of punishment by the kidnapping statute for
other substantive crimes committed by defendant, the appropriate time for the court to
decide the issue is after trial"), appeal withdrawn, 544 N.E.2d 233 (N.Y. 1989); People
v. Melendez, 533 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (Ct. Crim. N.Y. 1988) (rejecting defendant's pre-trial
Finlayson-type merger motion where "[m]aking such a determination is a fact-specific
process" in which "[t]he timing of the events [and "means employed to detain a victim"]
is crucial"); State v. McGuire, 686 N.E.2d 1112, 1119-20 (Ohio 1997) (rejecting claim
that trial counsel's "fail[ure] to seek before trial the merger of the kidnapping and rape
charges" constituted ineffective assistance where statute allowed for multiple charges and
merger was not issue until after conviction).
The reason for this result is self-evident: "[0]nly after the prosecution has
presented its case to the jury will the trial court have all the facts underlying the charges
before it and be able to make an informed decision about whether the kidnapping charges
should or should not be merged." Morales, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
Any other result would essentially force the State to conduct a trial before a
trial—in which the State must present all of its evidence supporting conviction for the
kidnapping charge as well as the alleged host crime—in order to provide the court with
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"all the facts underlying the charges before it," Morales, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 542, and then,
force the trial court to "predict [based on that evidence] which charges on which the
defendant will be convicted," MichiellU 937 P.2d at 592.
Because the trial court's consideration of defendant's Finlayson merger claim
before trial conflicts with Hawatmeh, this Court should reverse the trial court's dismissal
of defendant's aggravated kidnapping charge.2
B.

REPLY TO POINT A.2 OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: BECAUSE
DEFENDANT'S FINLAYSON MERGER CLAIM WAS
PREMATURE, THE TRIAL COURT COULD PROPERLY
CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ONLY AS A
MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER, TO WHICH THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING EVIDENTIARY STANDARD APPLIED
Defendant claims that, because his motion was heard after he had waived a

preliminary hearing, the evidentiary standard applicable to preliminary hearings did not
apply to his motion and the State had to establish separate offenses by a preponderance of
the evidence. Aple. Br. at 13-18. Because the trial court lacked discretion to consider
defendant's Finlayson merger claim before trial, defendant's motion to dismiss could
properly be considered by the trial court before trial only as a motion to quash.
Preliminary hearing standards apply to such motions, and defendant should not be

2

The only other case defendant cites, see Aple. Br. at 12-13, does not even address
the propriety of pre-trial merger motions, but rather, only the general reasons why the trial
court rather than the jury should decide the Finlayson-like merger issue. See State v.
Warner, 626 A.2d 205, 208 (R.I. 1993) (holding doctrine's "primary thrust is to avoid an
excess of prosecutorial zeal," which is a "question[]... to be determined in the first
instance by the trial justice subject to review by this court"). Nothing in Warner requires
that a trial court address a Finlayson-type merger claim before trial.
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allowed to increase the State's burden of proof merely by waiving a preliminary hearing
and then filing a motion to dismiss in the trial court.
In this case, defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing (R. 42). Thus, he
was bound over on both charges without an evidentiary hearing (R. 42). Defendant then
filed his motion to dismiss based on merger with the trial court (R. 48-53). Because no
evidentiary hearing was held prior to bindover, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing
before deciding defendant's motion (R. 83; R. 148:passim).
However, as previously discussed, the trial court could not properly consider
defendant's merger motion at this point. See Point A supra. Thus, the only issue
properly before the trial court before trial was whether the evidence presented at the pretrial hearing was sufficient to survive a motion to quash the bindover. Cf Kunzler v.
O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 1993) (holding that "title of a motion is not
dispositive"); see also People v. Melendez, 533 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1988)
(ruling that, because pre-trial merger claim was premature, only issue before trial was
whether "legally sufficient charges have been brought," i.e., whether the State has
"presented] & prima facie case that supports the charges and the defendant's commission
thereof). As discussed in the State's Brief of Appellant, the preliminary hearing
evidentiary standard applies to motions to quash, and the evidence presented at the pretrial hearing was sufficient to survive defendant's motion. See Aplt. Br. at 9-13; see also
State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1998).
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Moreover, even if the trial court could properly consider defendant's Finlayson
merger claim before trial, neither defendant's cases nor common sense mandate
imposition of a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof. In claiming that the
preponderance standard applies, defendant relies on three federal and two state cases. See
Aple. Br. at 16-17 (discussing State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300 (Utah 1992); State v.
Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467 and n.7 (Utah App. 1991); United States v. Jabara, 644 F.2d
574, 576-77 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1118-19 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 331-32 (3rd Cir. 1977)).
All of those cases address the standard of proof applicable to pre-trial motions
raising claims that a defendant's constitutional rights will be violated if trial proceeds
without a ruling on the motions. See Inmon, 568 F.2d at 328-29 (addressing challenge by
defendant to current charges as former jeopardy where he had already been convicted on
similar charges; noting forcing defendant to wait until after second trial "would .. . have
required that the defendant submit to the violation of his constitutional right not to be
tried again for the same offense in order to raise the issue"); Stricklin, 591 F.2d at 1115
(same); Jabara, 644 F.2d at 575-76 (same); Allen, 839 P.2d at 300 (addressing challenge
to voluntariness of defendant's pre-trial statements); Carter, 812 P.2d at 467 (addressing
challenge to voluntariness of consent to search).
Defendant's constitutional rights simply are not yet and, indeed, may never be at
stake here. No constitutional right is implicated in a pre-trial Finlayson merger motion
because it is not yet clear on which charges, if any, defendant will be convicted. See Ohio
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v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984) ('" While the Double Jeopardy Clause may protect a
defendant against cumulative punishments for convictions on the same offense, the
Clause does not prohibit the State from prosecuting [defendants] for such multiple
offenses in a single prosecution.'").
Thus, no reason exists to unnecessarily burden prosecutors, the courts, and
witnesses by imposing a standard of proof upon the State that inevitably requires a trial
before a trial, see p. 14-15 supra, on an issue most appropriately addressed at the
conclusion of trial.
Consequently, this Court should reject defendant's claim that, merely because he
waived his preliminary hearing and waited until he was bound over to challenge the
charges against him, a higher standard of proof applies than if he had challenged the
charges at the preliminary hearing stage.
C.

REPLY TO POINT B.2 OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: EVEN IF THE
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED DEFENDANT'S
FINLAYSONMERGER CLAIM BEFORE TRIAL, THE COURT
ERRED IN DISMISSING DEFENDANT'S AGGRAVATED
KIDNAPPING CHARGE
Defendant claims that the evidence here supported the trial court's merger ruling.

See Aple. Br. at 22-32. In fact, the evidence was quite clear that defendant committed
two distinct crimes.
As a preliminary matter, defendant notes that, in making its evidentiary argument,
"the state has not challenged the trial court's findings of fact relating to resolution of the
merger issue." Aple. Br. at 20. Assuming arguendo that the trial court properly
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considered defendant's Finlayson merger claim before trial, the State does not challenge
the trial court's factual findings. However, as the State's Brief of Appellant made clear,
the trial court's findings are incomplete. Cf. Aplt. Br. at 3-5, 15-16. This Court should
consider the complete evidentiary record in reviewing the trial court's ruling.
According to Katrina's pre-trial testimony, defendant locked her in his room, put a
gun to her head and threatened her and her family while he made several telephone calls,
and poked her with a piece of broken glass (R. 148:11-14). The aggravated kidnapping
was at that point complete.
Katrina was then able to unlock the door and escape (R. 148:11-14). Although
defendant followed her out of the room, caught up with her in another room, and beat her
with the gun several times in that other room, Katrina was able to gain the attention of the
home's owner, who told defendant to leave Katrina alone (R. 148:14-16).
At that point, hostilities ceased. Defendant asked Katrina to return to his room,
agreed to her demand to put the gun away, and then told her she could keep the door open
because "everything was going to be okay [and they] were just going to talk" (R. 148:16,
20). Only after this cessation of violence did defendant commit a new volitional act in
hitting Katrina again and then attempting to murder her by strangulation (R. 148:148:16,
20).
Based on this evidence, the State's argument is not that the kidnapping continued
throughout the thirty-five minutes to an hour during which Katrina and defendant were
together in his home. Rather, the State's argument is that the aggravated kidnapping was
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complete when Katrina was able to flee from defendant's room after defendant had
locked her in it, put a gun to her head, and threatened her and her family. Then, after a
cessation of hostilities, a new crime was committed—attempted murder—when defendant
persuaded Katrina to return to his room, and he subsequently tried to strangle her.
In challenging the State's claim, defendant contends that the State has not
adequately briefed its claim that his aggravated kidnapping and attempted murder charges
do not merge because the State did not specifically address the application of each of the
three Buggs factors to the facts of this case. See Aple. Br. at 22. However, where, as
here, two distinct criminal acts occurred and the evidence necessary to prove aggravated
kidnapping based on the use of a dangerous weapon was obviously separate from the
evidence necessary to prove attempted murder, any greater discussion by the State of the
Buggs factors—which arguably should not even apply—was unnecessary. Cf State v.
Burden, 69 P.3d 1120, 944 (Kan. 2003) (holding Buggs factors apply only when the
variation of kidnapping charged is that it was "done to facilitate the commission of
another crime"); see also R. 6 (charging aggravated kidnapping based on defendant's
"intent to inflict bodily injury on [the victim], or to terrorize the victim or another"); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 2001).
In any case, under these facts, the Buggs factors, if even applicable, were clearly
met. The aggravated kidnapping—which, based on the record, one could conclude took
up most of the thirty-five minutes to an hour that Katrina and defendant spent in his home
(R. 148:17)—was not "slight, inconsequential and merely incidental" to the attempted
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murder that followed. State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720, 731 (Kan. 1976) (first Buggs factor).
Nor was defendant's conduct during the charged kidnapping "of the kind inherent in the
nature" of attempted murder based on strangulation. Id. (second Buggs factor). Finally,
to the extent the third factor even applies to a kidnapping based on wholly distinct
conduct, the kidnapping had "significance independent" of the attempted murder because
it was completed before the attempted murder ever began. Id. (third Buggs factor).
In discussing the first and second Buggs factors, defendant does not acknowledge
the evidence showing a clear break in the violence between the aggravated kidnapping
and the attempted murder. . See Aple. Br. at 24-29. In discussing the third factor, he
acknowledges that Katrina was at one point able to flee defendant's locked bedroom and
that she "agreed to go back into Lopez's bedroom if he put the gun away, which he did."
Aple. Br. at 30-31 (emphasis added). He nonetheless maintains that his assault on
Katrina was one uninterrupted event. See id. The evidence clearly establishes that it was
not.
Defendant's cases do not obscure that result. In Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948, 951
(Del. Supr. 1988), Weber went into a former girlfriend's home and engaged in a
continous assault on her as the two moved from room to room in her house. Weber's
assault then temporarily ceased when he became sick and the victim temporarily left. Id.
It recommenced when the victim returned "to keep Weber from leaving and 'to get it over
with." Id. Weber was subsequently convicted of aggravated kidnapping and assault. Id.
In analyzing whether the kidnapping conviction merged with the assault conviction, the
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court focused exclusively on the conduct that occurred before the defendant became ill.
See, e.g. Weber, 547 A.2d at 959 ("[The victim] testified that she and Weber were
fighting continuously from the time the assault began until Weber became sick and
regurgitated.") (emphasis added). Where the assault was continuous, even though Weber
and his victim traveled throughout the house, the court concluded that "[t]here is no
evidence independent of Weber's assault on Long to support a separate conviction for
kidnapping." Id. In the instant case, the assault on Katrina was not continuous. Thus,
Weber is distinguishable.
In State v. Mead, 318 N.W.2d 440, 441 (Iowa 1982), the defendant accosted a
woman and her mother as they were about to enter the mother's home. The defendant
first grabbed the mother and put a knife to her throat. Id. In response, the daughter hit
the man, and the mother escaped. Id. at 442. The defendant then struck the daughter in
her face, kicked her, and ran away with her purse. Id. The defendant was convicted of
kidnapping and assault while participating in a burglary. Id. The court held that where
the "case involves a seizure of [the mother] by defendant, not a confinement of her," and
"[u]nder the statute, kidnapping cannot be predicated on merely 'seizing' another person,"
the trial court "should have dismissed the kidnapping count." Id. at 445. Here, in
contrast to Mead, Utah's aggravated kidnapping statute encompasses both the seizure of a
person as well as her confinement. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301, 76-5-302 (Supp.
2001). In any case, defendant here clearly confined Katrina in his room when he locked
her in it (R. 148:11,12). Thus, Mead is distinguishable.
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Finally, mMesser v. Roberts, 74 F.3d 1009, 1011 (10th Cir. 1996), the defendant
was convicted of aggravated battery and aggravated kidnapping based on evidence that he
had attacked his victim and rendered her unconscious outside a store front and then
dragged her fifteen feet to the back of the store and, while she was still unconscious,
assaulted her again. The court, applying the Buggs factors, held that the movement was
"'slight, inconsequential and merely incidental'" to the battery and did not make the
battery "substantially easier of commission" or "lessen the risk of detection" because the
battery had already been committed by the time of the movement, the second battery "did
not occur in a different room, or behind something that could have hidden the incident
from view," and the body was found "not behind furniture or other potential
concealment." Id at 1014-15. Here, unlike in Messer, the State is not claiming that the
asportation or confinement necessary to establish kidnapping occurred during the course
of defendant's other crime, i.e., his attempted strangulation of Katrina. Rather, as
previously stated, the aggravated kidnapping was complete when defendant confined
Katrina in his bedroom and threatened her with a gun and with a piece of glass.
Defendant's attempt to murder Katrina only followed later, after an agreed-upon cessation
of hostilities. Thus, Messer also does not apply.
Because the trial court erred in dismissing defendant's aggravated kidnapping
charge, even if the Finlayson doctrine applies to pre-trial hearings, this Court should
reverse the trial court's dismissal of the aggravated kidnapping charge.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to reverse the trial court's order
and reinstate the aggravated kidnapping charge against defendant.
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